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Introduction 
Egoism, in the most fundamental and basic sense, is the notion that one should 
promote and seek his or her own interest—in essence, that one should act selfishly 
and for the sake of one’s own self. Naturally, this in it of itself presents a multiplicity of 
problems and objectionable theses thereby often leading to the general rejection of 
the notion itself. However, this complete and utter rejection of egoism is not 
necessarily without fault, for often egoism is misconstrued and fallaciously defined in a 
similar fashion to hedonism, predation, materialism, or even solipsism; moreover, 
egoism as a moral or ethical principle is a veritable antithesis to the more commonly 
held and promoted ethical principles of altruism, utilitarianism, or any other ethical 
theory that holds others in higher regard than the self consequently inducing the 
rejection of any radical new form that breaches the status quo (for example, ethical 
egoism). Ultimately, as Tara Smith writes, because “egoism is widely perceived as 
reckless, self-indulgent whim-worship and the selfish person as thoughtless, 
unprincipled, and inconsiderate of others” it is readily dismissed, and if such were the 
case for all principles of egoism, then it indeed would be something that should be 
hastily disregarded and never considered as a legitimate moral theory, but as such, 
egoism is not lost to such irrational and thoughtless principles, for Ayn Rand, I think, 
presents a sound argument in favor of a rational, ethical egoism that precludes the 
commonly conceived issues with egoism and advances instead a logical moral theory 
that advances the welfare and wellbeing of the individual without the destruction or 
negative repercussions of others (5). 
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 The foundational point from which Rand develops her moral philosophy is not 
the question: “what particular code of values should man accept?” but “why does man 
need a code of values?” (Rand, “The Objectivist Ethics” 14). It is in the answer to this 
particular question that Rand develops her moral philosophy of egoism: a philosophy 
founded on logical, rational, objective principles outside “the province of whims” of 
(according to her) most moralist philosophers and instead “a rational, objectively 
demonstrable, scientific answer to the question why man needs a code of values” (14). 
This scientific answer to why man needs values is, according to Rand, rooted in the 
metaphysical facts of life: reality, existence. Therefore, in advocating for rational 
egoism, Rand is not doing so for the reason that it seems to be the best moral theory, 
or it suits her fancy greatest, but because it is fundamentally right in the presence of 
objective reality and harmonizes with the existence and flourishing of humanity.  
 Rand’s conception of egoism, aside from being founded on objective principles, 
differs from the more commonly conceived egoist principles: Rand rejects hedonism 
outright and argues that hedonism does not recognize the individual’s need for 
rational principles; she also is adamantly opposed to all forms of predation and 
solipsism claiming that these forms ignore objective facts of reality and ultimately do 
not contribute to any long term advancement of interests, nor are these moral 
theories it just in any sense, for they advocate the exploitation of others for the gain of 
the self. Instead, the intrinsic component in Rand’s egoism is rationality—that 
“acceptance of reason as one’s only source of knowledge and fundamental guide to 
action” (Smith 7). That is, that one should act in such a way as only guided by reason 
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and carefully evaluated thought processing grounded in reality and the way things are; 
in sum, as Smith writes, “rationality consists of fidelity to facts”—facts of metaphysical 
reality and being and the nature of life (7). Thus, in it of itself, rationality is the 
paramount moral virtue, for through rational action all other moral and ethical actions 
follow.  
 Ultimately, Rand’s ethical rational egoism is the construction and sum of 
multiple reasonings that conclude with her Objectivist philosophy. Here, I intend to 
present a summary of Objectivist ethics: to answer the question why man needs 
virtue, how ethical egoism and selfishness is a necessity rooted in metaphysical facts of 
reality, and how, through the virtues of life, Rand determines rational egoism the 
superior and singular moral philosophy. Moreover, I intend to discuss the W. D. 
Glasgow’s objection that ethical egoism bears an inherent contradiction and attempt 
to argue that while subjectivist forms of egoism may possess an inherent contradiction 
in the notion of conflicts of interests, Objectivist ethical egoism, by the way in which it 
is formed and founded, is not subject to Glasgow’s arguments and assertions. 
Presentation 
 The primary and most fundamental foundation to the entire Objectivist ethics 
is rooted in the question of why humanity needs morality. The answer to the question 
is simple: survival. Rand writes that to properly unpack any question of ethics, one 
must start at the beginning by asking: what are values? Rand defines values as “that 
which one acts to gain and/or keep”; this concept, she continues, is not a primary 
notion or foundational concept, for values “presuppose an answer to the question: of 
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value to whom and for what?” (“The Objectivist Ethics” 16). Therefore, the notion of 
value requires an actor, more specifically, an animate actor; John Galt, the protagonist 
of Atlas Shrugged, states that “value presupposes a standard, a purpose, and the 
necessity of action in the face of an alternative,” so “where there are no alternatives, 
no values are possible” (Rand, Intellectual 134). In essence, there must be a choice to 
be had or made, and ultimately, there is “one fundamental alternative in the universe: 
existence or non-existence” (134). This alternative only applies to living beings—a rock 
or a clod of dirt is merely a unit of matter with no volitional consciousness; they cannot 
be destroyed but reduced and changed, yet in all, they lose nothing. A living organism 
possesses life, so while the body itself will remain, the life may be extinguished by time 
or conscious or unconscious choice. Thus, it is “only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes 
the concept of ‘Value’ possible,” for “it is only to living entity that things can be good 
or evil” (134-5). 
 To clarify this point, Rand offers an example of an indestructible and immortal 
robot, a being which can act and move and function, but in all it cannot be destroyed, 
changed, or damaged. Such an entity, Rand writes, “would not be able to have any 
values; it would have nothing to gain or to lose; it could not regard anything as for or 
against it, as serving or threatening its welfare, as fulfilling or frustrating its interests”; 
such a being, because it cannot gain anything nor lose anything would possess no goals 
or interests in regards to survival and betterment (“The Objectivist Ethics” 16). 
Essentially, the robot, like a rock, would be in a position where there is no good for it 
nor anything bad for it. Contrarily, living things, from the most basic life forms to 
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humans, because they live and die, possess goal-oriented actions on the physical level 
all for the purpose of sustaining their existence, their life—a heart pumping blood in a 
human or parts of a cell performing their function in a bacterium. Therefore, writes 
Rand, an organism’s life depends on two factors: “the material or fuel which it needs 
from the outside, from its physical background”—food, sunlight, water—“and the 
action of its own body, the action of using that fuel properly”—acquiring more fuel and 
so forth; more specifically, in this context, proper—id est, how such fuel is used 
properly, or how one acts properly—Rand writes, is determined by measuring it to the 
standard of that entity’s life: “that which is required for the organisms survival” (17). 
For most creatures, the first and the second are interlinked in such a way that each 
follows the other; a plant, for example, from sunlight produces the necessary means of 
growing taller and further still increasing its need for fuel while simultaneously 
increasing its surface area for which it can photosynthesize; animals, likewise, hunt for 
food, and in so doing, they sustain themselves long enough until he next time they 
feed. Thus, for any non-human creature, it is a perpetual cyclical process of self-
sustaining action.  
 Rand writes that “the range of actions required for the survival of the higher 
organisms is wider: it is proportionate to the range of their consciousness” meaning 
that a plant, entirely unconscious of itself, merely grows upward toward the light in a 
manner most effective for its survival; contrarily, animals posses instincts and feel pain 
and so react accordingly (19). But humans are different. Humans possess more than 
just sensation that reacts to external and environmental stimuli; instead, “man’s 
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particular distinction from all other species is the fact that his consciousness is 
volitional”—that people have the power to make choices and decisions independent of 
external forces (21). Whereas animals are bound by their immediate environment and 
sensory reaction to environmental factors and innate sense, humans have the capacity 
to suspend their consciousness or act contrary to their own good; consequently, as 
Rand writes, “man has no automatic code of survival. He has no automatic course of 
action, no automatic set of values. His senses do not tell him automatically what is 
good for him or evil, what will benefit his life or endanger it” (21). Therefore, while the 
natural functions of a plant (the “automatic values” as per Rand) and the instinctual 
values of an animal are sufficient for their survival, humans require willful and 
conceptual knowledge and action: human survival is dependent upon the “guidance of 
conceptual values derived from conceptual knowledge” (21). 
 By conceptual knowledge, Rand means the acquisition of knowledge by the 
synthesis of concepts; in essence, it is the ability to apply language and thought to 
abstractions and concretes and in so doing expanding perceptions—what he or she 
knows or has seen—into concepts of thought and knowledge; it is by this process, 
writes Rand, “that man is able to grasp and retain, to identify and integrate an 
unlimited amount of knowledge” beyond the immediate perceived environment of 
real and present objects (21). Concepts allow an individual “to hold in focus of his 
conscious awareness much more than his purely perceptual capacity would permit”: 
one can only see so many objects (a finite number) within his or her range of vision at 
a given time—he or she cannot see exceptional distances or microscopic organisms by 
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the naked eye, but one can imagine or know of such a thing, for it is the “conceptual 
faculty that makes it possible for him to deal with knowledge of that kind” (Binswanger 
88). However, this ability that the human brain possesses—to know and think of 
objects not immediately present—is not a passive and automatic function of the mind; 
the brain functions automatically and perceives on a subconscious level (impressions 
can be made on the mind and the perception without an consciously active thought 
process), but the integration and synthesis of concepts and the process of concept-
formation requires an active state of mind on the part of the individual: 
conceptualizing, according to Rand,  
is an actively sustained process of identifying one’s impressions in conceptual 
terms, of integrating every event and every observation into a conceptual 
context, of grasping relationships, differences, similarities in one’s perceptual 
material and of abstracting them into new concepts, of drawing inferences, of 
making deductions, of reaching conclusions, of asking new questions and 
discovering new answers and expanding one’s knowledge into an ever growing 
sum. (“The Objectivist Ethics” 22) 
In short, it is an individual’s effort to learn more and increase his or her base 
knowledge through inquiry and mental processes; directed by the faculty of reason, it 
is the process of thinking.  
 For humans, the knowledge that comes from sensory perception is only a 
primary (a first order) level of knowledge, but this alone does not alone necessarily 
provide humans enough knowledge to survive. For example, dryness in the throat 
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might alert an individual that he or she is thirsty, but it does not tell how one should 
acquire fluids; pain in one’s stomach indicates hunger, but it does not tell one how to 
gather and prepare the food: nature or natural instincts do not provide for humans as 
they do for animals, so instead, humans must exercise reason—they must think—in 
order to solve their problem or they risk perishing. Thus, everything that a person 
“needs or desires has to be learned, discovered, and produced by him—by his own 
choice, by his own effort, by his own mind”; reliance on instinctual action alone is not 
enough for an individual to survive, for it is by the power of the mind and the power of 
reason—the conceptual faculty that allows the mind to integrate thoughts and 
memories to produce and create knowledge—by which an individual survives (24).  
 Just as primary sensory perceptions only provide an individual with enough 
knowledge to know something immediately (that he or she is hungry or thirsty), so 
does primary knowledge provide the first indications of right and wrong. What causes 
severe and immediate pain or pleasure can serve as an initial function for providing 
base knowledge regarding what is right or wrong for an individual; this is helpful in the 
early stages of life where pain or pleasure can alert a young child to the degree which 
he or she is benefiting from an action. But as an individual grows older and develops 
his or her rational faculty and the ability to integrate experiences, primary knowledge 
fails to be as much of a benefit. For some things may be pleasurable initially, but later 
that certain thing or experience could wreak a greater degree of harm; likewise, an 
initially painful experience could prove to be ultimately very beneficial for the 
individual. Thus, the faculty of reason is absolutely necessary in this regard to 
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determine—beyond merely the primary pleasure and pain indicators—what is good or 
bad (good or evil) for an individual. This knowledge that the individual garners and 
develops through the formation of concepts and the integration of primary knowledge 
allows the individual to know what is true or false, right or wrong, good or evil; this 
knowledge, writes Rand, is the knowledge “he needs...in order to live” (24). For every 
conscious organism, knowledge is the means of survival; this means, writes Rand, that 
“every ‘is’ implies an ‘ought’”—what is true means that one ought to act in a particular 
way in response (24). However, what one ought to do does not mean one has to do it; 
in this way, Rand states, man is free to ignore his consciousness and volition, but man 
is “not free to escape the penalty of his unconsciousness: destruction,” for it is this 
freedom, she writes, that allows man to be “the only living species that has the power 
to act as his own destroyer” (24).  
 Therefore, because humanity has the capacity to destroy itself—more 
specifically, humanity must act preventatively in order to not destroy itself—there 
must exist a set of goals to guide humans from acting contrary to their welfare and 
interests; these goals or guidelines are established, writes Rand, within and by the field 
of ethics. More specifically, ethics “is an objective, metaphysical necessity of man’s 
survival—not by the grace of the supernatural nor of your whims, but by the grace of 
reality and the nature of life” bound to the exterior objective reality superseding 
human control; they are a “code of values to guide man’s choices and actions—choices 
and actions that determine the purpose and course of his life” (“The Objectivist Ethics” 
25; Branden, “Isn’t Everyone Selfish?” 66). The Objectivist ethics are in this way simple: 
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the Objectivist ethics establishes human life as the standard of value—“the standard 
by which one judges what is good or evil”—with particular emphasis on “that which is 
required for survival qua man” (25). This is determined, moreover, by reason: that 
which a rational person establishes as proper or helpful to his or her life and welfare is 
good; that which is hurtful or which negates or destroys life is evil.   
 The primary component of Rand’s ethical philosophy is that value is objective; 
that is, as Smith writes, “what is good for a  person—what is in his interest—is not 
simply a subjective projection of that person’s beliefs, attitudes, tastes, or desires, for 
those are not adequate guides to meeting his life’s requirements” (25). The reason is 
that reality does not allow for subjective or whimsical or arbitrary motions—it is 
unyielding in its nature. However, Rand is not stating that value exists inherently in the 
external world; it is not “a freestanding feature nestled within certain things” that are 
intrinsically good or bad (25). Rather, value “is always good to someone and for some 
end,” for “material objects as such have neither value nor disvalue; they acquire value-
significance only in regard to a living being—particularly, in regard to serving or 
hindering man’s goals” (Smith 25; Binswanger 522). Rand defines value as “that which 
one acts to gain and keep”; value, therefore, implies an object or goal of some form of 
action: “it is that which some entity’s action is directed to acquiring or preserving” 
(Binswanger 523; Peikoff 208). This particular definition has certain implications 
regarding the behavior of an individual: Peikoff writes that “goal-directed behavior is 
possible only because an entity’s action, its pursuit of a certain end, can make a 
difference to the outcome” (208). This means that an individual’s action toward any 
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goal is motivated by the possibility of that individual achieving that goal; if, however, 
there is no amount of action, regardless of any degree of exertion, that will gain the 
goal-directed object, then it is not an object of value because it is impossible to 
obtain—it exists outside the field or realm of value. 
 The notion or concept of values presupposes two things: an entity (human, 
plant, animal) that is capable of acting in such a way toward an object, and an object 
that requires a certain amount of action if it is to be attained (209). Therefore, no 
inanimate objects—rocks or pencils—pursue values, for they are not living organisms 
and can neither pursue them nor do they have any need for them. It is therefore living 
organisms that make values and the concept of values possible, for “they are the 
entities capable of self-generated, goal-directed action—because they are the 
conditional entities, which face the alternative of life or death”; living organisms, for 
the reason of the existence/non-existence dichotomy (that the only alternative to 
existence or life that a living organism has is non-existence or death), are the only 
entities that can and must pursue values (209). Moreover, writes Peikoff, it is this 
“alternative of existence or nonexistence *that+ is the precondition of all values”—this 
is the fundamental context by which values are judged, or the way by which values 
have value (209). Any object not faced with this alternative has no need of goals nor 
can it pursue goals. 
 The best way of approaching this concept is to contextualize it in Rand’s 
example of the immortal and indestructible robot.  This machine, precluded from 
destruction or vital and mechanical failure, requires no action to sustain itself: it does 
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not need to eat, drink, sleep, or even move, for there is nothing that can either harm 
or work to preserve it. The absence of the possibility of life or death and existence or 
nonexistence removes all “possibility of need satisfaction or need frustration” 
physically; therefore, simultaneously removed from the robot are all sensory percepts 
and incentives that accompany the need satisfaction and frustration dichotomy that 
exists within all conscious beings and creatures (Peikoff 210). Peikoff also writes that 
on a psychological level, the indestructible robot has no needs for goals that exist 
beyond the realm of physical frustrations and satisfactions: conceptual knowledge 
(knowledge formed through synthesis of perception and learning) is entirely 
unnecessary, for an entity that cannot be destroyed, does not need to establish—
intellectually—ways of survival; thus, nothing that would normally satisfy an individual 
beyond carnal and animalistic needs—money, entertainment, knowledge, and so 
forth—achieves nothing in satisfying the robot (210). Similarly, the indestructible robot 
does not possess the faculty for emotional satisfaction or frustration; for example, 
where most humans or conscious beings enjoy the pursuit of happiness, the robot has 
no need: happiness, writes Peikoff, “is the emotion that proceeds from the 
achievement of one’s values...it presupposes that one holds values” (210). The robot 
does not desire or possess values because it does not need to hold values: there is no 
fundamental and foundational alternative for its existence; it does not need to 
consciously decide (when confronted with a  choice) what is proper for its existence 
because nothing can harm it or aid it, and because nothing can harm or help it, it does 
not require nor possess any value in anything. 
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 Thus, writes Peikoff, “to an indestructible entity, no object can be a value”; 
rather, only an entity—human, animal, or living things—with the potential for 
nonexistence and the means for prevention of such “has a need, an interest (if the 
entity is conscious), a reason to act”—that is, to act to avoid destruction or death and 
to preserve its life and existence (211).  Thus, the ultimate goal which serves no other 
goal beyond itself for all conscious creatures is to “remain in the realm of reality”; 
therefore, ultimately, “goal-directed entities do not exist in order to pursue values. 
They pursue values in order to exist” (211). In other words, it is an ultimate goal that 
makes values possible, and metaphysically, writes Rand, “life is the only phenomenon 
that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action”—that 
is, the preservation and sustenance of life is the ultimate goal (Binswanger 521). 
Concomitantly, in epistemology, “the concept of ‘value’ is genetically dependent upon 
and derived from the antecedent concept of ‘life’”; therefore, to separate the concepts 
is necessarily fallacious, for “it is only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of 
‘Value’ possible” (521). As such, life is the foundation and necessary means for value. 
Thus, the most foundational element of Rand’s argument in ethics and values is 
founded here: that only the alternative of life and death, the dichotomy of existence 
and nonexistence that creates the necessary position and context for value-oriented 
action; however, this only applies if an entities end is to preserve its life. As such, 
writes Peikoff, “by the very nature of ‘value,’ therefore, any code of values must hold 
life as the ultimate value,” and it is this thesis—this principle—that all of Objectivist 
ethics rests (212).  This explodes the issue of the is-ought question, for the ultimate 
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value for any entity is the preservation of its life;  therefore, the fact that one is 
thereby determines what one ought to do, and all of this is to be performed through 
“validation of value judgments” in context and “in reference to facts of reality” 
(Binswanger 521).  
The is-ought dichotomy is solved by the fact that because one is a living, 
conscious being, one ought to therefore sustain that in pursuit of the ultimate goal: life 
and the preservation of life. However, according to Rand, life is in a constant and 
perpetual state of dynamic motion: it is moving and in a constant state of flux. As a 
result, passivity on the state of any individual ultimately results in that individual’s 
resignation from life. Moreover, for Rand, life and death are absolutes; that is, one is 
either pursuing life and longevity, or one is falling toward destruction and death; 
ultimately, therefore, Rand writes, “in a fundamental sense, stillness is the antithesis 
of life”; life can only be preserved and maintained in existence “by a constant process 
of self-sustaining action” (Binswanger 255). Correlatively, Peikoff writes that “life is 
motion. If the motion is not self-preserving, then it is self-destroying” (215). 
Consequently, according to the Objectivist philosophy, a conscious individual must 
always be engaged in the motion of self-sustaining and self-preserving action.  
Perhaps the most central premise of the Objectivist ethics is the way in one 
must act in the pursuit of his or her values in the act of preserving his or her life; in 
essence, it is, according to Rand, the very foundation for one’s means of living: 
rationality. This means “the recognition  and acceptance of reason as one’s only source 
of knowledge, one’s only judge of values, and one’s only guide to action”; moreover, 
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to be rational is to commit complete and undivided focus to all questions, issues, and 
decisions one is confronted with (Binswanger 404). Rationality, according to Rand, the 
basic virtue for all conscious humans; it is the foundation and source of all other 
virtues. Conversely, “man’s basic vice, the source of all his evils, is the act of 
unfocusing his mind, the suspension of consciousness, which is not blindness, but the 
refusal to see, not ignorance, but the refusal to know”—this is irrationality: the 
rejection of all virtues and all means of survival and self-preservation; it is the 
“commitment to a course of blind destruction”—that “which is anti-mind, is anti-life” 
(Rand “The Objectivist Ethics” 28-9). This means, that in all aspects of one’s life—work, 
school, personal matters—one must engage his or her decisions with regard to reality 
and in consideration to oneself in all manners of logic and objectivity. In essence, one 
must never attempt to dodge or evade reality or attempt to rationalize illogical whims 
and desires. Instead, one must be firmly rooted and grounded in reality and reason at 
all times and in all places; one must be committed to reason, “not in sporadic fits or on 
selected issues or in special emergencies, but as a permanent way of life” (Binswanger 
404). 
 For Rand, one cannot be rational or follow reason unless he or she actively 
engages or follows it. Rationality requires a perpetual state of mental activity engaged 
in a regular “daily process of functioning on the conceptual level of consciousness” 
(Peikoff 222). Rationality is engaging the active faculty of mind, not merely registering 
impressions made upon the individual by outside or foreign entities and events, for  
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 it is an actively sustained process of identifying one’s impressions in conceptual 
terms, of integrating every event and every observation into a conceptual 
context, of grasping relationships, differences, similarities in one’s perceptual 
material and of abstracting them into new concepts, of drawing inferences, of 
making deductions, of reaching conclusions, of asking new questions and 
discovering new answers and expanding one’s knowledge in an ever-growing 
sum. (Rand, “The Virtue of Selfishness” 22) 
This is thinking. This action must be engaged by choice and the volitional 
consciousness of the actor; this action is not a passive phenomenon that will come to 
existence by random whim or occurrence. Thus, an individual that mindlessly pursues 
activities in an unfocused manner is not rational: “a man does not qualify as rational,” 
writes Peikoff, “if he walks around in a daze but once in a while, when someone 
mentions a fact, he wakes up long enough to say ‘I’ll accept that’” only to return to his 
former mindless self and passive state of mind (222).  
 Humans, according to Rand, are different from other creatures in that humans 
have the ability to act as their own destroyer. According to Objectivism, rationality is 
the primary means of human survival; however, any individual is perfectly able to 
engage in irrational behavior which, consequently, equates to his or her eventual 
destruction—that act of focusing the mind (engaging in rational thought and behavior) 
is entirely up to the will of that individual. The consequences of his or her action, 
however, are inescapable: all consequences of an individual’s actions are products of 
reality. The greatest threat to rational behavior, or rather, the primary method of 
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escape from rational thought is the engagement of the anti-effort mentality. Thinking 
in such a manner produces an attitude that attempts to act evasively of realty—that is, 
“blanking out some fact of reality which one dislikes”  in order to escape a certain 
particular of or in reality (224). Ultimately, this results in destruction, for reality is not 
subject to the mind and therefore created, destroyed, or altered by the mind of an 
individual. In his speech in Atlas Shrugged, John Galt states that A is A, and no amount 
of thinking otherwise will ever alter that fact. Thinking otherwise is the engagement of 
non-thinking: an “act of annihilation, a wish to negate existence, an attempt to wipe 
out reality” (Rand For the New Intellectual 142). The problem with this form of 
thinking, continues Galt, is that “existence exists; reality is not to be wiped out, it will 
merely wipe out the wiper”—the evader of reality, that individual who attempts to 
escape the facts of reality and life (142). 
 Most evaders, according to Rand, do not try to entirely evade or avoid reality; 
rather, evaders localize or minimize what they evade. They take one small fact of 
reality and blank it out and ignore it, yet despite the mitigation of their evasion, the act 
of evasion is destructive because everything in reality is interconnected and bound 
together. One cannot simply blank out a single point only, for that fact is not isolated 
in its own reality; in order to sustain this, writes Peikoff, “one would be gradually 
forced to expand and keep expanding the scope of one’s blindness,” for anything that 
is connected to it—either threateningly or benignly—the evader would have to blank it 
out as well ultimately resulting in total nonperception (225).  This complete 
nonperception spells the inherent problem in evasion: the inability to integrate 
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knowledge and percepts into the knowledge useful for survival. In this state, writes 
Peikoff, an individual no longer possesses the ability to know truth from falsehoods or 
consistency and contradiction; in the mind and consciousness of an evader, “all 
conceptual content is reduced to the capricious, the baseless, the arbitrary,” for “no 
conclusion qualifies as knowledge in a mind that rejects the requirements of 
cognition” (225). Ultimately, the individual that chooses to blank aspects of reality—to 
evade reality—descends into a blindness that disallows the process and end of 
concept-formation, so as a result of this action, knowledge cannot be garnered 
ultimately resulting in destruction or death. 
  Being an act of irrationality and therefore contrary to rationality, evasion is 
evil; Peikoff writes that “evasion is the Objectivist equivalent of a mortal sin...because 
it makes possible every other form of moral corruption” (224). However, evasion is not 
the only constituent of irrationality. The second primary form in which irrationality is 
manifested and formed is by whims. That is, that one does not consciously think or 
perform mental processes when confronted with a choice. Instead, the individual 
arbitrarily makes a choice with little regard for the consequence. Rand defines whim as 
“a desire experienced by a person who does not know and does not care to discover 
its cause” (“The Objectivist Ethics” 14). Such an individual does not exercise 
introspection, nor does he or she analyze the foundations of a want or desire; rather, 
the individual just acts without thinking rationally and weighing the consequences and 
effects of an outcome of a particular decision. To act on whim, writes Rand, is to “act 
like a zombie, without any knowledge of what he deals with, what he wants to 
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accomplish, or what motivates him”; in essence, it is to act in complete ignorance to 
reality, oblivious to the consequences, and apathetic to all functional elements 
involved (Binswanger 531).  
 Rand is careful here to make the distinction that whimsical decisions are not 
necessarily decisions based on emotion; that is, one cannot simply reduce the issue to 
emotions versus reason. It is entirely fallacious to assume that the two are mutually 
exclusive, and because Objectivism advocates reason, then therefore emotion is 
entirely precluded. Rather, emotion is perfectly human and entirely rational if reason 
precedes it. Emotion, as Rand defines it, “is an automatic response, an automatic 
effect of man’s value premises”; it is an effect of something and not a cause 
(Binswanger 142). Thus, the perceived dichotomy of reason or the faculty reason and 
emotional faculties is nonexistent (at least, there is no conflict between the two). 
According to Rand, a rational person is aware of the source of his or her emotions; 
moreover, an individual “never acts on emotions for which he cannot account, the 
meaning which he does not understand” (142). Emotions are therefore not a guide for 
actions, for the guide of actions is an individual’s mind; emotions are instead a way of 
enjoying aspects of life. If, however, one does choose to let his or her emotions guide 
their values and pursuits, and reverses the process exercising his or her reason to 
rationalize a decision, then this, writes Rand, is to act immorally, for that individual “is 
condemning himself to misery, failure, defeat, and will achieve nothing but 
destruction” (142).  
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 Acting on whims, therefore, do not necessarily denote emotional decisions or 
acting with only regard for emotions. Instead, a perfectly rational person, with 
perfectly balanced reason and emotions integrated together in harmony, will possess 
feelings but not whims: feelings and whims in a rational person are antithetical—
feelings, the consequence of rational thought and introspection in a rational person is 
not dichotomously antipodal to reason but closely linked. As Peikoff writes, “think, and 
you shall feel” (229).   
 The final aspect of Objectivist ethics needs to be addressed: that is, who the 
proper beneficiary of one’s actions ought to be. Rand writes that the standard of value 
is the individual’s life; however, this in itself is not specific enough, for to merely state 
that an individual’s life ought to be the standard of value does not specify whose life 
should be the standard. Thus, for the reason that one should set life is the standard of 
value in the pursuit of his or her happiness, it rationally follows that the self should be 
the standard of value in the pursuit of values. Thus, the core of Objectivism is egoism: 
that one should rationally pursue self-interest  and maintain a policy of selfishness. 
When asked why she titled her book The Virtue of Selfishness, and why, more 
specifically, she chose the word “selfishness,” Rand replied: “for the reason that it 
makes you afraid” (Rand The Virtue of Selfishness vii). However, it is not necessarily 
semantics or arbitrary choice that Rand chose “selfishness” over some other 
synonymous  word, for she writes that the popular meaning ascribed to the word “is 
not merely wrong: it represents a devastating intellectual ‘package-deal,’ which is 
responsible, more than any other single factor, for the arrested moral development of 
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mankind” (vii). In the popular or lay sense, the word, while not necessarily 
synonymous with immorality, bears a heavy negative connotation: an image of “a 
murderous brute who tramples over piles of corpses to achieve his own ends, who 
cares for no living being and pursues nothing but the gratification of the mindless 
whims of any immediate moment” (vii). However, this image that is most popularly 
associated with selfishness is constructed entirely removed from the true definition of 
the word; quite simply, selfishness means “concern with one’s own interests” (vii). 
Selfishness, the word, does not contain within it moral evaluation or judgment, nor 
does selfishness state what an individual pursues or does—it strictly only refers to who 
is the beneficiary of an action: the self. 
 The morality of selfishness or egoism (which, in Objectivism, are more or less 
synonymous) therefore, is not determined by the definition of the word necessarily. 
Egoism merely states who should profit, not what should occur; thus, addressed 
independently, writes Peikoff, egoism “offers no practical guidance,” for it fails to 
specify values and virtues, and “it does not define ‘interests’ or ‘self-interest’—neither 
in terms of ‘life,’ ‘power,’ ‘pleasure,’ nor anything else” (230). Ultimately, egoism 
merely states that whatever constitutes an individual’s self-interest, that individual 
should endeavor or strive to achieve.  
 Egoism, for Rand, is entirely an absolute concept; that is, when one performs 
an act in which there is some beneficiary, either the performer regards his or her 
primary moral obligation to him or herself, or the performer regards his or her primary 
moral obligation to an entity other than him or herself at the cost of denying or 
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subordinating the self. This alternative, to subordinate oneself, is directly antithetical 
to the Objectivist philosophy and constitutes perhaps the greatest Objectivist ethical 
evil: unselfish self-sacrifice. Egoism, for Rand, is not something she arbitrarily thought 
to be the superior ethical theory because it is the most satisfying; rather, she validated 
her claim by “showing that it is a corollary of man’s life as a moral standard” (230). This 
validation is as follows: the dichotomous contraposition of life and death and existence 
and nonexistence provides the foundation and creates the context for value-oriented 
actions and decisions, and life (self-preservation or the sustaining of the self) is the 
ultimate goal (for no goals can exist beyond that of life—in essence, the preservation 
of life is not a mean to some other higher end). This concept of preservation and self-
preservation is not an abstract concept formulated but never applied, for the each 
organism is confronted with the reality that it is its own existence that is at stake—its 
own life or death; thus, the goal is the preservation of its own self and the continued 
existence of its own body, functions, faculties: life. 
 Every organism possesses to some degree an automatic process that works and 
functions for the ultimate purpose of sustaining some aspect of that organism’s life. 
When plants photosynthesize for fuel and animals hunt and feed for the sake of self-
preservation, these organisms are acting in line with their interests: they are pursuing 
values necessary for their survival: as living entities, writes Peikoff, “each necessarily 
acts for its own sake; each is the beneficiary of its own actions” (231). However, moral 
terms such as “egoist” or “altruist” do not apply to any organisms other than humans 
because morality implies choice; animals do not act on choice but instinct—they 
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cannot choose to act as a beneficiary for some other creature, for they do not have a 
volitional consciousness. Humans are different. Humans are volitional creatures and 
have the choice to act in their own interests or in the interests of others, and while 
inward bodily functions (the heart, the lungs, the brain) work toward the maintenance 
of the organism’s life, the individual, as a conscious and volitional being, must make 
choices that sustain his or her own being (which consequently results in a direct effect 
upon the inwardly or automatic bodily functions). Humans, therefore, “must choose to 
make self-sustenance into a fundamental rule of his voluntary behavior,” and the 
individual who acts in this way—that his or her conscious behavior is directed toward 
self-preservation—is an egoist (231). 
 Peikoff writes that the principle of existence that demands egoism as an 
essential way of survival because “survival requires an all-encompassing course of 
action”; in essence, life, in its perpetual motion, requires value-oriented action in both 
immediate and long term contexts (231). An individual cannot sustain his or her life 
over an extended period of time if he or she serves some other goal or purpose than to 
preserve his or herself; Objectivist ethical theory holds that an individual’s life is an 
absolute matter: what action that is not directly for the sake of self-preservation works 
in the antithetical direction—against his or her life. Continued or sustained action in 
this way eventually results in the destruction of the individual’s life; this principle, 
moreover, that that which is not action for an individual’s life is against universally 
applies to all aspects of an individual’s life. To compromise this in any way—to 
essentially surrender any part of one’s values or sacrifice oneself for something other 
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than the sustenance and preservation of oneself—is, writes Peikoff, “to declare war on 
life at the root” (232). Life requires the pursuit and procurement of values through 
action, achievement, and success; contrary actions—self-denial, resignation, 
abnegation—that distract from selfish behavior is antithetical to life; sacrifice, in other 
words, is the destroyer of life. 
 Rand is careful to distinguish between two forms of sacrifice—both equally 
immoral—in the Objectivist ethics: the sacrifice of the self or self sacrifice (self-denial, 
surrender, abnegation) and the sacrifice of others (subordinating others for one’s own 
gain). Self-sacrifice is the antipole to life. Rand defines sacrifice as “the surrender of a 
greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a nonvalue” (“The Ethics of 
Emergencies” 50). By this definition, the very nature of sacrifice is irrational: the 
rational principle of conduct demands that one act in accordance with one’s values 
and for the sake of one’s values, the ultimate value being his or her life. Moreover, this 
principle applies to all actions, motives, and choices regarding the self and toward 
other people; this therefore requires, writes Rand, that one “possess a defined 
hierarchy of rational values”—values validated and formed by a rational standard and 
in harmony with reality—for if there exists an absence of such values, “neither rational 
conduct nor considered value judgments nor moral choices are possible” (50).  
 In his radio speech, John Galt defines sacrifice as not “the rejection of the 
worthless, but of the precious...not the rejection of evil for the sake of the good, but of 
the good for the sake of evil. Sacrifice is the surrender of that which you value in favor 
of that which you don’t” (Rand For the New Intellectual 156). Thus,  trading an excess 
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of money—a value—for a pebble—a nonvalue—is a sacrifice, for that is the 
surrendering of some higher value for a lower value; however, if an individual gives 
one’s life defending his or her country and freedom, that is not a sacrifice, for that 
individual would rather fight for freedom and die than live under some other law, but 
if that individual who fears to fight and lives in slavery, it is a sacrifice. Ultimately, 
sacrifice is the surrender of what one holds valuable to something or someone that he 
holds less valuable. Galt states, 
 Sacrifice could be proper only for those who have nothing to sacrifice—no 
values, no standards, no judgment—those whose desires are irrational whims, 
blindly conceived and lightly surrendered. For a man of moral stature, whose 
desires are born of rational values, sacrifice is the surrender of the right to the 
wrong, of the good to the evil. (158) 
Thus, sacrifice is improper for those have something to sacrifice—those with values, 
standards, and judgment, those who desire values based on cognitive judgment and 
rational thinking developed through introspection and self-reflection. To expect a 
rational person to commit to a sacrifice is to expect that he or she will surrender his or 
her judgment, act antithetically to knowledge, deny the reality of the context—
essentially, ask him or her to release the mind and abdicate all rational faculties. 
 The motions through life require the rational individual to follow his or her 
cognitive conclusions regarding metaphysical reality in relation to his or her welfare 
regardless of the opinions or whims of other people or the consequences his or her 
actions might have on others’ consciences. Thus, if evidence suggests that he or she 
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act in a certain way that is rational and fully validated, then he or she should proceed 
with little or no regard to what other people might feel or think—whether it makes 
others happy or sad, if that is less of a value to an individual than the rational value 
which he or she seeks to pursue, then it would be immoral to do anything than pursue 
that value. Peikoff writes that “since thought is an attribute of the individual, each man 
must be sovereign in regard to the function and product of his own brain”—he or she 
must act in fidelity to the facts of reality and the summations and products of his mind 
(232). Ultimately, this is impossible, however, if it is expected of him by others to value 
others’ welfare, whims, opinions, thoughts, or desires over his or her own rational 
conclusions. Thus arises the problems with the non-egoistic moralities (altruism, for 
example): it is expected that the individual suffer a compromise to his or her 
individuality, mind, in essence, his or her life. 
 The question is therefore raised regarding sacrifice and those that the 
individual cares about or loves, for to love is regarded widely as an unselfish act. 
However, Rand argues that contrary to what is commonly believed, “love and 
friendship are profoundly personal, selfish values: love is an expression and assertion 
of self-esteem, response to one’s own values in the person of another”; what results is 
a profound and deep personal joy from the existence of that other individual and of 
the love that binds the two: “it is one’s own personal, selfish happiness that one seeks, 
earns and derives from love” (Rand “The Ethics of Emergencies” 51). Thus, if an 
individual has a spouse or friend that he or she loves deeply, to insert oneself into an 
uncomfortable position for that other person is not a sacrifice if it is correlative with 
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that individual’s hierarchy of values. Rand offers the example of the man who has a 
wife with a terminal illness: he is passionately in love with his wife and cares for her 
deeply. If he spends a fortune in an attempt to maintain her life or cure her, Rand 
writes, it would then be “absurd to claim that he does it as a ‘sacrifice’ for her sake, 
not his own, and that it makes no difference to him, personally and selfishly, whether 
she lives or dies” (Binswanger 431). This is absurd for the reason that if he holds his 
wife higher in his hierarchy of values than money, then it is not a sacrifice—
surrendering a lower value for a higher one is not a sacrifice, it is rational. Rather, it 
achieves a greater amount of happiness for him because the preservation of her 
existence is more important to him than money; ultimately, he is pursuing a value—his 
wife and her life—that will generate a greater degree of happiness for him. 
 Contrary to this, however, the man would be committing a sacrifice if he 
followed the code of altruism: if he surrendered the life of his wife and let her die so 
he could donate that money he would spend on her to save the lives of more than one 
other person whom he does not know, then it would be a sacrifice. For the difference 
between the other people he does not know and his wife only differs in respect to the 
value that she holds in the husband—that is, she is of far greater value to her husband 
than any other people that he does not know: his happiness is not contingent on those 
individuals that have no effect on his life, but his wife’s welfare does hold great weight 
in the nature of his happiness. What is most important, according to the Objectivist 
ethics, is the achievement of one’s own happiness—that is the highest moral standard, 
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so thus, the way the man acts to achieve that goal is not sacrifice; anything antithetical 
to his happiness is sacrifice.  
 The contrary aspect to self-sacrifice is the equally malignant and evil sacrifice of 
others for the sake of one’s own gain.  A common misconception with egoism is the 
image of the brute that requires sacrifice of others for the sake of personal gain; 
however, Rand is adamantly opposed to this for two reasons: first, it treads on other 
people’s rights and their individualism and is therefore barbaric and immoral, and 
second, it is unnecessary, for a rational person does not require the sacrifice of others 
for his or her welfare and the sustenance of his or her values. Rand writes that 
 there is a fundamental moral difference between a man who sees his self-
interest in production and a man who sees it in robbery. The evil of a robber 
does not lie in the fact that he pursues his own interests, but in what he 
regards as to his own interest; not in the fact that he pursues his values, but in 
what he chose to value; not in the fact that he wants to live, but in the fact that 
he wants to live on a subhuman level. (Rand The Virtue of Selfishness ix) 
In this way, therefore, selfishness in it of itself does not denote or imply sacrifice of 
others. One can live a perfectly selfish life without sacrificing others. The robber, in this 
case, does not sacrifice others—id est, by seizing property without earning it in a 
respecting way—because he is selfish, he takes because his values are misdirected; he 
has not rationally formed his values, they are the product of some other faculty—
whim or emotion—without proper validation. In this case, therefore, the evil in the 
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robber can be traced to a lack of cognitive effort, not selfishness; to irrationality, not 
egoism. 
 The ultimate moral responsibility of an individual, according to Objectivism, is 
the achievement of one’s own happiness; however, Rand is not sanctioning a 
hedonistic whimsical free-for-all in achieving happiness: this achievement of happiness 
“does not mean that he is indifferent to all men, that human life is of no value to him 
and that he has no reason to help others,” nor does it mean “that the good is 
whatever gives you pleasure and, therefore, pleasure is the standard of morality” as 
the doctrine of hedonism claims (Rand “The Ethics of Emergencies” 49; Binswanger 
200). Ultimately, the problem with these two mentalities is the lack of reason involved 
in choosing to set values in either case. As I have already noted, Rand regards love and 
friendship as profoundly selfish acts—both which provide various amounts of 
happiness to the individual involved in the relationship. Thus, a complete indifference 
to all men only serves to rob an individual of the happiness contained within those 
values. Moreover, Objectivist ethics do not sanction the sacrifice of others, so 
therefore, in order to remain within the realm of morality, I think, there is required at 
least some degree of care for fellow human beings: that is, enough care that prevents 
one from being a complete brute and sacrificing others, enough care that 
demonstrates respect for their integrity as well as his or hers. 
 Hedonism is immoral in a way that emotional decisions are immoral: it inverts 
the process of reasons. Hedonism regards whatever brings pleasure is moral; 
Objectivism, contrarily, states that the good “must be defined by a rational standard of 
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value, that pleasure is not a first cause, but only a consequence, that only pleasure 
which proceeds from a rational value judgment can be regarded as moral” and as such, 
pleasure—much like emotion—cannot be regarded as a standard of morality 
(Binswanger 200). To regard pleasure as a moral standard allows for decisions and 
value-oriented action based on both rational and irrational cognition, conscious and 
unconscious thought. It is neither moral to assume value-oriented action and later 
rationalize the decision. Ultimately, pleasure, like emotions, is a byproduct rational 
thought and action, not a cause for action. Put another way, Rand writes that 
“’happiness’ can properly be the purpose of ethics, but not the standard”; to act in 
such a way where happiness is the standard ultimately translates into a state where 
“the proper value is whatever you happen to value”—an uncontrolled state with no 
rational anchoring or foundation (Rand “The Objectivist Ethics” 29). The proper role for 
ethics is to define how happiness should be achieved through a proper code of values; 
to act as hedonism would suggest, denies the purpose of ethics and recklessly pursues 
the path of irrationality and incognition.  
 Egoism’s primary premise is that the individual should act as the beneficiary of 
his or her own action; the Objectivist ethical egoism states that the individual should 
act in his or her own rational self-interest. This, however, writes Rand, gives the 
individual right to act in such a way because that “right to do so is derived from his 
nature as man and from the function of moral values in human life”; in essence, this 
applies “only in the context of a rational, objectively demonstrated and validated code 
of moral principles which define and determine his actual self-interest” (The Virtue of 
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Selfishness xiii). Thus, he must act with regard to metaphysical reality and objective 
values: what is actually in the individual’s interest objectively and not merely what the 
individual thinks or feels is in his or her interest. Reason, in this case, denies the 
individual “a license ‘to do as he pleases’”; moreover, it precludes the notion of the 
selfish brute and it denies the morality of value-oriented action by any individual 
“motivated by irrational emotions, feelings, urges, wishes, or whims” (xiii). The fact 
that rationality is the dictator of moral virtue addresses the issue of what Rand calls 
the Nietzschean egoists: those egoists “who believe that any action, regardless of its 
nature, is good if it is intended for one’s own benefit” (xiii). This manner of thought is 
closely related to hedonism, but differs slightly: it abandons rational thought and 
instead assumes that egoism is to be followed at the cost of anything or everything but 
the self; thus, an extremist in this viewpoint would justify the infringement upon the 
lives of others for the sake of his or her own gain. Moreover, it commits the error of 
attempting to include a moral evaluation in “selfishness”; it essentially states that if it 
is good for the individual, or if it is a selfish act, then it is good. This is diametrically 
opposed to Objectivism, for Objectivism states that rationally determined objective 
values are what should be pursued, and the beneficiary should be the self. The 
Nietzschean  egoism opens the door of morality to whims; Rand’s response is that 
“morality is not a contest of whims” (xiii).  
 Finally, the last related error in egoism related to the Nietzschean egoism and 
hedonism is that an individual, in his desire to be guided by his own mind and faculty, 
declares that “any action he chooses to take is moral if he chooses it” (Binswanger 
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448). This is similar to the Nietzschean egoist conception, except that the individual 
does not declare it moral because it benefits him, but rather, it is moral because he or 
she deems it to be. The primary error in this way of thought is that it assumes that 
one’s judgment is infallible: an individual’s judgment, writes Rand, is not the validation 
that is required to determine the morality of something—the individual’s judgment is 
the means. Rational judgment is the only way of achieving moral ends, but it is neither 
“a moral criterion nor a moral validation: only reference to a demonstrable principle 
can validate one’s choices” (448). That is, only validation within in the context of the 
objective reality with regards to objective values can properly justify an action. And all 
of this is only achieved by rational means. All other egoistic fallacies as demonstrated 
fail because of one fatal flaw: they do not function on the foundation of reason.  
 Hedonism, Nietzschean egoism, and other forms of egoism conceived without a 
rational and objective basis for their grounding are essentially theories of egoism 
perverted by a severe lack of objectivity; this denial or absence of the objective 
element in their conception is what Rand calls subjectivism. There are two 
fundamental types of subjectivism in this context that lead to the flaws in these forms 
of egoism: metaphysical subjectivism and consequently, its fallacious offspring, ethical 
subjectivism.  The ultimate guiding principle in Objectivist ethics is the fact that reality 
exists, that A is A, and no amount of thinking otherwise will change that fact; thus, 
while one can work to alter reality (by physically interacting with it), reality still exists 
independent of what an individual thinks or feels. In metaphysics, subjectivists hold 
“that reality (the ‘object’) is dependent on human consciousness (the ‘subject’)” which 
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would consequently mean that “reality is not a firm absolute, but a fluid, plastic, 
indeterminate realm which can be altered, in whole or in part, by the consciousness of 
the perceiver” (Binswanger 486). This is impossible, however, if reality is independent 
of the human consciousness—reality cannot be altered as if it were fluid or plastic; the 
subjectivist doctrine, therefore, contradicts the facts of reality—the important element 
in Objectivism is that reality is objective and independent of the consciousness, not 
fluid and subject to the mind.  
 The most glaring problem with metaphysical subjectivism is that it denies the 
truth regarding a question or issue that corresponds to facts. According to 
subjectivists, the consciousness creates or adapts or molds the reality which therefore 
alters the truth rendering it subject to each individual person. Thus, if ever an 
individual creates for themselves a different reality, slightly altered from the next 
person, the truth or validity of statements would vary from consciousness to 
consciousness—what would hold true for some would not be true for others. Peikoff 
writes that the fallacy of the subjectivist lies in the fact that he or she would not say 
something is true (for that implies objectivity), but that something is true for that 
individual. Therefore, he concludes, “there is no truth, only truth relative to the 
individual or a group—truth for me, for you, for him, for her, for us, for them” 
(Binswanger 487). 
 Metaphysical subjectivism—the subjectivity or reality and the variance of 
truth—ultimately present problems beyond just metaphysics. Objectivist ethics are 
founded on the metaphysical fact that reality is real, that existence exists. The morality 
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of Randian egoism stems from the idea that it is most helpful for the individual to be 
selfish because of its consistency with reality; in other words, reality—metaphysics—
mandates, for the sake of survival, that an individual be an egoist. The problems with 
egoism arise when that foundation is removed. The moment an individual decides to 
perceive reality in a way that is not consistent with what exists or what is real is the 
moment when egoism encounters issues. Thus, metaphysical subjectivism translates 
into ethical subjectivism, a severe ethical fallacy and immoral school of ethics. 
Metaphysical subjectivism holds that reality or existence are products of the human 
consciousness; ethical subjectivism holds that “the good bears no relation to the facts 
of reality, that it is the product of a man’s consciousness, created by his feelings, 
desires, ‘intuitions,’ or whims, and that it is merely an ‘arbitrary postulate’ or an 
‘emotional commitment’ (488). So thus, ethical subjectivism denies that there is any 
objective or intrinsic value or good in reality, but that the good is ensconced in the 
individual’s consciousness.  
 This theory creates multiple ethical problems, so like metaphysical 
subjectivism, where the truth is not objective but subject to the individual, so in ethical 
subjectivism, the good or the moral is subject to the individual. This manner of thinking 
results in moral chaos and ethical anarchy: there is essentially no governor of values. 
Instead, what best suits an individual’s fancy becomes what is moral for that person—
what that individual feels, wishes, or wants becomes the good and there is no 
counteract to that. Thus, the charges against egoism that it is purely immoral only exist 
because of conceptions of subjectivist egoism, but those charges do not hold against 
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Randian egoism for the reason that Rand’s conception of egoism does not allow for 
that ethical anarchy; she firmly established a governor for moral values: reason, and 
reason is further bound to the greatest factor in determining morality: reality.  
 Now by having stated what the Objectivist conception of egoism is not 
(subjective), I would like to return to what, more specifically, egoism is. In a letter to 
Professor John Hospers, Rand writes that “an egoist is a man who acts for his own self-
interest”; moreover, “man’s ego is his mind; the most crucial aspect of egoism is the 
sovereignty of one’s own rational judgment and the right to live by its guidance” 
(Berliner 553-4). Thus, a true egoist is not just one who acts in one’s own best interest, 
nor is it necessarily one who acts in his or her own rational self-interest, but rather, the 
true egoist, the most selfish person the one with the independent mind: Galt states in 
his speech that “the most selfish of all things is the independent mind that recognizes 
no authority higher than its own and no value higher than its judgment of truth” (Rand 
For the New Intellectual 159). Thus, the egoist is the independent individual. Those 
who claim to be egoists in their immoral activity—robbing, cheating, whimsical 
pleasure-seeking—are not truly egoists, for they are not truly independent. Activities 
such as theft imply a dependence on others for sustenance. A true egoist relies on no 
one or nothing other than his or her own mind. A true egoist, writes Rand, 
in the absolute sense is not the man who sacrifices others. He is the man who 
stands above the need of using others in any manner. He does not function 
through them. He is not concerned with them in any primary matter. Not in his 
aim, not in his motive, not in his thinking, not in his desires, not in his source of 
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energy. He does not exist for any other man—and he asks no other man to 
exist for him. (Rand For the New Intellectual 88) 
This relationship, according to Objectivism, is the only form of mutual self-respect that 
can exist between individuals—that every individual act in his or her own rational self-
interest. 
 A common misconception of Randian egoism is the assumption that Rand’s 
statement that an individual does not need others (that he “stands above the need of 
using others”) means that the individual must live his or her entire life in solitude. This 
assumption is grossly fallacious. In today’s world, the need for others is constantly 
growing, but this is not a need for that individual necessarily. Rather, it is the need for 
what that individual produces. Therefore, if an individual is productive in some way 
and maintains an independent mind, then it is proper for that person to enter in some 
sort of relationship with others who also have something to offer. This sort of 
relationship is rational. However, if one is not productive it would be absurd for that 
individual to expect to come into a similar relationship, for that individual would have 
nothing to offer (be it money, goods, services, and so forth). Thus, to a certain extent 
there is interdependence, but Rand is not referring to that necessarily. Rather, she 
means full independence of thought and consciousness. A person may need food, but 
he or she is free to decide where to get it; a person may need tech services, but that 
individual is free to subscribe to any one of the services offered. Thus, John Galt, in his 
speech, states that he owes no obligation to anyone, himself, or anything but 
rationality. He states,  
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 I deal with men as my nature and theirs demands: by means of reason. I seek 
or desire nothing from them except such relations as they care to enter of their 
own voluntary choice. It is only with their mind that I can deal and only for my 
own self-interest, when they see that my interest coincides with theirs. When 
they don’t, I enter no relationship...I do not surrender my reason. (Rand For the 
New Intellectual 133). 
Galt’s statement is, in essence, the Objectivist conception of egoism: care for the self 
and reason and rationality in all relationships, thoughts, motives, values, actions, and 
things. This Objectivist egoism, rational and firmly rooted in reality, maintained in this 
way is the means to one’s sustenance of life and existence—it is the preserver of one’s 
integrity, the path toward happiness, the inducer of self-flourishing. And for this 
reason, it is moral and singularly the most superior ethical philosophy to which one 
can adhere. 
  
Defense 
There seems to be an attempt to refute ethical egoism on the grounds that it is 
inconsistent and contradictory; that is, that a practitioner of ethical egoism cannot 
necessarily be an egoist because he or she would contradict his or her values in any 
situation where there is a conflict of interest. Roughly summarized, W. D. Glasgow 
argues that an ethical egoist believes that everyone ought to act in a manner that is in 
their best interest; however, this implies that the egoist must be willing to accept 
other individual’s autonomy, but in some cases, to do so would result in an outcome 
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that is not in the egoist’s best interest, and therefore, the egoist encounters a 
contradiction. I think, however, that the Randian ethics from her philosophy of 
Objectivism in its conception and formulation of ethical egoism avoids the 
contradiction and escapes Glasgow’s assertions and claims: that is, because Objectivist 
ethical egoism separates the value of an action from the beneficiary of an action—that 
a moral action is not determined and qualified by who benefits—the Objectivist 
conception of ethical egoism does not suffer the problems that lead to the inherent 
contradiction. Therefore, my argument is not necessarily that Glasgow’s claims are in 
them of themselves not sound or valid; rather, I hold that Ayn Rand’s conception and 
formulation of ethical egoism—ethical egoism founded on objective values—does not 
bear this alleged inherent contradiction in the conflict of individual’s interests and 
values and therefore escapes Glasgow’s claims and arguments.  
 The contradiction Glasgow perceives is best illustrated in his arguments as 
follows:  
   A      B 
 I ought to do what is in my interest  and  I may or may not care about Tom, 
Dick...   And      and 
 Tom ought to do what is in his interest and Tom may or may not care 
about me, Dick... And      and 
 Dick ought to do what is in his interest and Dick may or may not care 
about me, Tom... Etc.      etc.  (82) 
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Here, he states, one can see the inherent problem in egoism, for Glasgow argues, the 
egoist argues that everyone (Tom and Dick) ought to look after and pursue his or her 
own interest. To state this, consequently, essentially grants that there are other 
individuals who are autonomous. Glasgow defines an autonomous individual as one 
who “has the ability to consider the possibilities of action that are open to him in a 
particular situation, who can deliberate upon each of these possibilities, in the sense 
that he can weigh up the reasons for and against actualizing any given possibility, and 
who can come to a decision which he has the ability to carry out” (83).  He continues, 
stating that it would be perfectly possible for an individual to be autonomous in this 
sense, “and yet deliberate, decide, and act within the confines of his own wants”; this 
sort of action, Glasgow states, would be that of “the prudent man” (83). This egoist 
(consistent with Column B) would accept and consider others as autonomous; 
however, that individual’s regard for others would be constrained by the extent to 
which they either promoted or impinged his or her own interest resulting in a 
disposition where others’ value would be “instrumental not intrinsic” (83). 
 Glasgow, at this point, has only shown that one half of the egoist position is 
contradictory, for the egoist of Column A would not accept that particular position; 
rather, egoist A, Glasgow states, would recognize the autonomy in others in the same 
way he or she would recognize it in him or herself: in essence, “he recognizes that the 
judgments and actions of other individuals can be rationally justified, just as he himself 
can justify his own judgments and actions” (83). Consequently, in believing this way, 
the egoist of Column A would acknowledge that the wants of others can provide 
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reasons for their actions just in the same way his or her wants provides a reason for 
action; thus, this implies, writes Glasgow, that the egoist, “as a rational agent, is willing 
to consider seriously, and sometimes accept, the judgments, and the resultant actions, 
of other rational individuals” (83). In other words, the resultant actions of other 
rational individuals can, for the egoist, be regarded as acceptable for both the egoist 
and the others committing to those actions. 
 Now this, Glasgow asserts, is where the problem with ethical egoism lies; he 
holds that there is a problem when actions or reasons of others that are “acceptable” 
(in the above stated sense) to the egoist conflict with the egoists best interest. 
Glasgow concedes that it is possible that the egoist may accept that the action is 
reasonable, so (maintaining a consistency with Glasgow’s examples) if it is in Tom’s 
best interest to do something, the egoist may say that Tom ought to do so even 
though Tom’s doing so would contradict or conflict with the egoist’s best interest. 
However, continues Glasgow, the egoist cannot advise Tom to do something against 
his or her own best interest because that would result in the egoist doing something 
against his or her own best interest; rather, it would be in the egoist’s best interest to 
encourage Tom not do commit that particular act. What results is a moral conundrum 
for the egoist: he or she realizes that Tom ought to act, yet he or she must advise Tom 
to not act; but, Glasgow continues, if the egoist realizes or knows that Tom ought to 
act, then this implies that the egoist approves of Tom’s acting (even though it is not in 
the egoists best interest). Thus the contradiction: the egoist would thereby be 
approving of something that is not in his or her own best interest, “a position logically 
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intolerable for an ethical egoist” (84). Glasgow concludes his argument by stating that 
when an individual states that someone ought to do something (that Tom ought to do 
X), then that person is recognizing the autonomy of that other figure (Tom, for 
example). However, asserts Glasgow, respecting the autonomy of another individual is 
not consistent with ethical egoism, for to do so means the surrender the position as an 
autonomous person; there is, writes Glasgow, “after all, for the egoist but one 
autonomous individual (himself) who is also an end in himself” (84). Stated another 
way, the egoist denies that others are ends in themselves “because he believes that he 
should be concerned only with his own interest: he himself is the only autonomous 
individual who is also an end in himself” (Glasgow “Ethical Egoism Again” 70). 
Ultimately, therein lies the contradiction. 
 Before I proceed and attempt to defend Rand from Glasgow, I need to clarify 
the difference between subjectivist egoism and Objectivist egoism. However, before 
one can effectively understand the understand the contrast between Objectivist 
egoism and non-Objectivist egoism, I need to properly define and articulate the 
Objectivist concept of value. According to Objectivist ethics, egoism in it of itself only 
identifies one aspect of a moral or ethical code: it “tells us not what acts a man should 
take, but who should profit from them”—that each “individual’s primary moral 
obligation is to achieve his own welfare, well-being, or self-interest” (Peikoff 230). The 
second and equally as crucial aspect of Randian ethical egoism is what action an 
individual should take, and this action is determined by value. A primary feature of 
Objectivist ethics is that value is objective: “what is good for a person—what is in his 
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interest—is not simply a subjective projection of that person’s attitudes, beliefs, 
tastes, or desires,” for such subjective desires are sufficient guides and means for 
meeting one’s life requirements (Smith 25). Value does not mean, furthermore, that a 
preference or desire for object by an individual is necessary or beneficial for one’s 
survival and as such valuable, nor is value something that is intrinsic or inherent; Smith 
writes that “value is not found ready-made in the external world, a freestanding 
feature nestled within certain things” (25). Now, the presence of values, according to 
Objectivist ethics, is made existent and relevant by the very most foundational and 
fundamental alternative an individual faces: life or death. Consequently, “any code of 
values must hold life as the ultimate value” (Peikoff 212). Yet no object or thing is good 
or valuable in it of itself; rather, value is always good to some individual or for some 
certain end. This means that values serve a purpose: they advance a person’s life and 
well-being. Thus, something can be considered objectively valuable—an objective 
value—if it offers a gain or ultimate benefit for an individual’s life. In this way, it is 
impossible for an individual to establish values that conflict with his or her self-
interest. The reason why an individual holds values is because the values further that 
individual’s self-interest: as Peikoff writes, “entities do not exist in order to pursue 
values. They pursue values in order to exist” (211). 
 Certain things are necessarily valuable for humans such as life and all of its 
necessary constituents and needs—food, water, and so forth. However, there are also 
many things that are objectively valuable for one person that may or may not 
necessarily be objectively valuable for another. For example, an individual who is sick 
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would be in need of medicine; therefore, the proper medicine, in this case, would be 
objectively valuable for that person—outside of that individual’s wishes or wants, the 
medicine would serve the purpose of furthering and advancing that person’s life. 
Contrarily, for a person who is healthy, that medication may not be valuable, and as 
such, the medicine is not objectively valuable. While there are necessary values for the 
sustenance of life, there do exist values that are optional. For example, wealth may be 
reasoned to be valuable, yet this does not denote an imperative: any individual may 
choose a line of work or career that procures little money if he or she has good reason 
for doing so. This value, therefore, of amassing vast quantities of wealth is optional. 
Ultimately, thus, values serves an individual’s needs, but values are not universally 
valuable. Therefore, the objectivity of value “rests in the relationship between specific 
ends and a particular person’s life”; thus, something that is good is good for a person, 
but “what makes a thing good is its nature and impact on the person’s life 
independently” of their beliefs and wishes regarding that impact on their life (27).   
 Rand defines an egoistical person as one “who acts for his own self-interest” 
(Berliner 553). This does not, however, denote or state what that interest is; therefore, 
it is not necessarily egoism itself that determines the morality or value of something, it 
merely states who should be the beneficiary of an action. The morality and value of 
something, argues Rand, is to be determined in the field of ethics.  In Objectivist ethics, 
the value of something is determined by a rational standard validated within the 
context of reality; Rand maintains “that an egoist is a man who acts for his own self-
interest and that a man should act for his own self-interest; however, self-interest only 
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“identifies one’s motivation, not the nature of the values that one should choose” 
(554). Contrarily, traditional egoists and primarily subjectivist ethical egoists hold that 
the value and morality of something or some act lies inherently in the notion that it 
benefits the individual; this results in the mentality of “I will do what I want, and it is 
right because it pleases me” or “because it is right for me, it must be good.” An 
individual engaged in this sort of behavior, “a self-destroying, whim-worshipping 
neurotic is not a representative of the ego; in fact, he has neither self nor interests—
and it is certainly not self-interest that he pursues and achieves” (554). Instead, the 
subjectivist egoist ultimately ends in destruction. Objectivist ethics rejects the 
subjective egoistic values: Objectivism rejects the evasion of reality and principles and 
the notion that what one arbitrarily deems is right for the self therefore means it is 
necessarily moral. The sacrifice of others—theft and extortion, for example—is 
predation, it is not in any way a constituent of Objectivist ethics. Ultimately, the key 
distinction is that Objectivist egoists form their values through rational thought and 
sufficient introspection and from there proceed to act whereas subjectivist egoists 
establish their values based on either pleasure or whatever benefits them. 
 Part of the reason why Objectivist ethics escapes Glasgow’s arguments is that 
Objectivism divides value and morality from beneficiary. That is, he defines egoist an 
agent who “has but one duty, viz., to produce for himself the greatest balance of good 
over evil,” and later he also states that ethical egoists who desire happiness have to 
“make up *their+ mind*s+ about which course *they+ ought to take which will be in 
*their+ own best interest” (“Contradiction” 81; “Ethical Egoism Again” 67). It is the 
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subjectivist definitions of egoism that conflate value and selfishness into one moral 
package; Objectivist ethical egoism partitions the two concepts. Egoism or selfishness 
only denotes who should be the beneficiary; it does not state what is good or what 
one should value. Therefore, to say something benefits an individual is not saying the 
same thing as something is moral. There is nothing that is moral for one person and 
immoral for another, necessarily. Value is objective. Conflating value and selfishness 
(in essence, to say what is good for me must be good) is a gateway to ethical anarchy: 
there is no controller of what is moral and immoral. Objectivism holds reality as the 
controller, the governor of values. Thus, Glasgow’s argument only stands against those 
who believe that selfishness in it of itself is complete in its morality; however, 
Objectivism asserts that this is not the case, for there must be a process of cognition 
and validation in both choosing values and pursuing values. Ultimately, therefore, 
Objectivism manages to escape Glasgow’s assertions: Objectivism has, from and as a 
result of its foundation, avoided the predicament—this alleged inherent conflict—
altogether. 
 There is one other matter I would like to address in Glasgow’s paper, and that 
is the notion that there can be a conflict of interests in rational people. Glasgow claims 
that example above regarding Tom performing some act that conflicts with the egoist 
demonstrates that there could be conflicts of interests between two rational 
individuals. He writes that if Tom performs X and it conflicts with the egoists self-
interest, then the egoist, therefore, “cannot really accept in any full-blooded sense 
that in a case of conflict of interests, Tom ought to do X” (“Contradiction” 84). 
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However, I think that within the realm of Objectivist ethics, there are no conflicts of 
interests which would consequently mean there could be no such scenario, and as 
result, Objectivism does not contain this contradiction.   
 Rand writes that a “man’s interests depend on the kind of goals he chooses to 
pursue, his choice of goals depends on his desires, his desires depend on his values—
and, for a rational man, his values depend on the judgment of his mind” (Rand 
“Conflicts” 57). The crux of this chain lies in the fact that desires are not proper 
foundations for cognition or action. To act on a desire is to fail to divorce oneself from 
the subjectivist egoists; desires, in them of themselves, do not validate value nor 
justify action. That an individual desires a certain thing or end is not proper criterion 
that it is in the individual’s best interest. A diabetic can desire candy, but this would 
not be in the diabetic’s best interest. A person bedridden from a bacterial infection 
may desire to not take the prescribed antibiotics, but this would not be in the person’s 
best interest. Thus, the object of desire may not necessarily mean it is good (or moral), 
so neither does the existence of a desire denote that it is in fact in the individual’s best 
interest. A fully rational individual, therefore, does not formulate goals based strictly 
on desires; rather, that individual chooses his or her goals—based on his or her 
rational and validated values—through process of reasoning and cognitive practices. 
This rational individual does not desire and then rationalize; rather, the individual will 
reason and formulate goals and values, and what follows is the desire to pursue those 
goals or values.  The rational person does not think it is right because he or she wants 
it; rather, the individual “does not act until he is able to say: ‘I want it because it is 
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right,’” and through all this, it is reality that is the “paramount consideration in the 
process of determining his interests” (58). 
 The second element of the Objectivist egoist that separates him or her from 
Glasgow’s contradiction is that he or she realizes that the gain or one individual or 
another does not equate to a loss for the egoist. Rand writes that “a rational man 
knows that man must achieve his goals by his own effort, he knows that neither wealth 
nor jobs nor any human values exist in a limited, static quantity, waiting to be divided” 
(62). As a result, the rational individual realizes that if he or she does not achieve what 
he or she intended to get, then it is not a loss or a detriment to his or her interest: 
what one individual gains does not translate to a loss for another—an individual that 
achieves a certain end does not mean that those who did not achieve it were sacrificed 
and the achiever earned it at the expense of others. If Tom pursues and achieves X, the 
egoist whose “interest was conflicted” was not sacrificed: Tom did not achieve X at the 
egoist’s expense. If a track athlete wins the 100-meter dash, the other seven 
contestants are not sacrificed in doing so, nor did the winner win at the expense of 
those other athletes.  If two applicants are applying for a certain position, the one who 
is not hired is not sacrificed, nor is it at his or her expense. What one does not already 
possess, what one has not earned, one cannot lose through sacrifice. Thus, a rational 
individual, asserts Rand, “never imagines that he has any sort of unearned, unilateral 
claim on any human being—and he never leaves his interests at the mercy of any one 
person or single specific concrete” (63).  
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 The subjectivist egoist, however, is subject to this notion of conflict of interests. 
The subjectivist will think that he or she, because he or she desires it, was sacrificed in 
the pursuit of a job or in Tom’s achievement of X. He or she might prematurely lay 
claim to the job or to X with the blind and irrational notion that because they desire, 
because they want it, it is good for them. And because it is good for them, then any 
other individual who is in pursuit of the same is a threat and is conflicting with their 
interest. Thus, a rational individual will regard Tom as autonomous, as an end in 
himself, for a rational egoist will realize that he has no inherent or rightful claim to X 
because he is aware of the nature of reality. It is because he is cognizant and is in a 
perpetual state of reasoning that he knows that he has no claim on any end or any 
person, and therefore, the pursuit of some end is only achieved by his own effort and 
earning. Ultimately, that two individuals desire the same end does not mean that 
either of them are (a) entitled to it, and (b) that that end is good for either of them; 
also, that two individuals that pursue an end and only one reaches it does not mean 
that one was sacrificed, that his interest was compromised; it means, rather, that one 
earned it, and the failure of the other to achieve that end means merely that he or she 
failed to reach that end, not that he or she was sacrificed or used in the process. 
 Glasgow’s argument, therefore, as I have shown, holds no bearing over 
Objectivist egoism. First, Objectivism does not recognize the conflation of moral value 
and selfishness (or egoism) into one package as the subjectivists do. Moral value is not 
based on what an individual thinks is best or what works best for the individual, so 
therefore, Glasgow’s argument in this respect does not and cannot apply to the 
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Objectivist egoism theory. Second, in Objectivism, there is no such thing as conflict of 
interests: a rational individual does not set goals and establish interests based on 
strictly arbitrary desires; neither does a rational being lay claim to anything that he or 
she has not earned; finally, the gain of one individual does not mean a loss for 
another—one person can gain much and another nothing, this does not mean that the 
one who gained nothing lost anything. Therefore, while Glasgow’s argument and 
charges against ethical egoism may have some traction against subjectivist notions and 
conceptions of egoism, I think that Objectivist ethics and the Randian conception of 
ethical egoism properly and fully escapes the charges that Glasgow levels. 
Conclusion 
 The Objectivist ethics and the Randian formulation of egoism, for the reason 
that it is founded on reason and rooted in reality, seems to escape problems 
commonly associated with prior or other forms of egoism. Thus, what I have presented 
and analyzed is not my original formulation of egoism, but what I perceive as a valid 
and logical moral theory—one that does not place imperatives or demands on an 
individual or expect others to surrender values and goals for a greater or common 
good, but rather, one that asks individuals to exercise their faculties to think and act in 
a moral, proper, and life sustaining way, and consequently, one that respects the 
integrity and dignity of each person as their own individual. In conclusion, I would like 
to let Ayn Rand have the last word to summarize, in essence, what Objectivism and 
more specifically Objectivist ethics is. Rand writes, 
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 I am not primarily an advocate of capitalism, but of egoism; and I am not 
primarily an advocate of egoism, but of reason. If one recognizes the 
supremacy of reason and applies it consistently, all the rest follows. This—the 
supremacy of reason—was, is and will be the primary concern of my work, and 
the essence of Objectivism. Reason in epistemology leads to egoism in ethics. 
(Binswanger 410) 
Reason, egoism: these are the root and core of ethics—these are what are moral and 
what are right. 
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